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interest rates outside the US? 
New evidence based on interest rate differentials 
Ansgar Belke, Daniel Gros and Thomas Osowski* 
CEPS Working Document No. 416 / January 2016 
1. Introduction 
Huge adverse shocks generated by the financial crisis caused economic decline and turmoil 
on the financial markets in 2008. Even after sharp reductions in (short-term) interest rates, 
central banks worldwide could not reduce the effects of the financial crisis substantially. With 
interest rates near zero, central banks lost their main policy tool because the zero lower bound 
proved to be a larger constraint than previously assumed by a large share of economists.1 In 
response, central banks around the globe undertook unprecedented policy interventions, the 
so-called ‘nonstandard measures’. 
Regarding the pure size of measures undertaken, the Fed was the most active central bank by 
implementing several non-standard measures – most notably several rounds of quantitative 
easing (QE). The first round of QE was announced and launched in November 2008, mainly 
aiming to calm the turmoil on financial markets and stabilise the US economy. After the 
termination of QE1 in March 2010, QE 2 started in November 2010, followed by Operation 
Twist in September 2012 and an additional round of QE (QE3) in September 2012. Apart from 
the Fed, the Bank of England (BoE, 2009-2014) and the Bank of Japan (BoJ, since 2010) also 
made use of large-scale asset purchase programmes in order to generate additional monetary 
stimulus at the lower zero bound. 
While there have been noticeable differences2 between the QE rounds conducted by the Fed 
and the central banks of other leading industrialised countries, a common aim of QE has been 
to put pressure on long-term yields. 3 By reducing long-term yields, the Fed expected to further 
stimulate economic activity and prevent significant declines in inflation rates.4 Furthermore, 
another QE mechanism runs via the exchange rate. However, long-term assets (and thereby 
interest rates) as well as exchange rates are often more affected by expectations about the 
future than by current economic conditions. The announcement of a programme can therefore 
have a stronger impact than its actual implementation. With respect to the impact of QE on 
                                                   
* Corresponding author: Ansgar Belke, ad Personam Jean Monnet Chair for Macroeconomics and 
Director of the Institute of Business and Economics, University of Duisburg-Essen, Campus Essen, 
Universitätsstr. 12, 45117 Essen, Germany, e-mail: ansgar.belke@uni-due.de. Daniel Gros is Director of 
CEPS and Thomas Osowski is a Research Assistant at the University of Duisburg-Essen. 
1 See Chung et al. (2012). 
2 For a comparison of QE designs in the US, see Rosengren (2015) and Fawley & Neely (2013). 
3 Apart from Operation Twist in the 1960s, the BoJ launched a purchase programme in March 2001. 
Even the BoJ claimed that the policy has been largely ineffective, however.  
4 The impact on yields is not a priori clear, however. If QE strongly increased expectations about future 
inflation and growth, yields should actually increase.  
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the nominal exchange rate, it is important to note that not each country can benefit from a 
nominal depreciation of their local currency, if several central banks start large-scale asset 
purchase programmes at the same time. 
To measure the longer-term impact of QE on interest rates, interest rate relationships and 
exchange rates is inherently difficult, because one has to make many assumptions about how 
asset prices such as the exchange rate and the interest rate would have evolved in the absence 
of QE.5 Furthermore, there is evidence that the impact of QE depends on the design of the 
programme, the economic environment and a country’s economic structure.6 For example, in 
the case of Japan (long-term) interest rates had been very low for a long period and seemed 
little affected by the increasingly aggressive asset purchases of the BoJ. However, the yen 
started to depreciate strongly once the asset purchase programme was greatly increased in 
size and scope. By contrast, the effective dollar exchange rate moved little at the time of the 
announcement and implementation dates of the different asset purchase programmes 
operated over the last seven years by the Federal Reserve. In the case of the UK, one actually 
observed a trend-wise appreciation of the pound over the period during which the BoE bought 
large amounts of gilts, and there was apparently some impact, albeit only temporary, on long-
term interest rates (Gros, Aldici & De Groen, 2015).  
The real difficulties go even deeper, however. The majority of available studies just look at 
developments within the country undertaking QE and neglect the global environment. Global 
financial markets are highly integrated and (long-term) rates have been highly correlated 
across advanced economies, not only along a downward trend, but also during cyclical ups 
and downs. Over most periods, rates have declined as much, sometimes more, in areas where 
QE was not undertaken. There is no sign that the fact that the ECB did not undertake bond 
purchases when they were undertaken by the US and the UK in any way prevented interest 
rates in the euro area from following US rates downwards when only the US implemented QE 
(Gros, Aldici & De Groen, 2015).  
According to the literature on the national (but also international) transmission of QE shocks, 
authors generally pronounce two main transmission channels: the signalling channel and the 
portfolio-balance channel. Although both channels might explain a certain number of the 
movements of financial variables in response to QE, we believe that the global comparative 
evidence is also, and probably even more compatible, with the view that QE did not ‘move’ 
interest rates, but appeared to be important because major central banks undertook purchases 
when they realised that the recession caused by the financial crisis would be longer and more 
severe than anticipated. In this regard, it is also possible to explain the decline in interest rates 
before announcements of QE have been made by central banks. This observation might 
indicate that markets were quicker to revise their expectations and rates had thus come down 
before central banks started to buy assets. Therefore, market participants and central banks 
with their announcements of QE reacted to the same driving force; namely stronger adverse 
effects of the financial crisis than previously expected. In this regard, the prolonged weakness 
affected most of the developed world. Interest rates thus fell trend-wise in most advanced 
                                                   
5 For the counterfactual analysis in macroeconometrics with an empirical application to QE, see Pesaran 
& Smith (2012). 
6 See Rosengren (2015) for an assessment of how the design of the Fed’s QE programmes have affected 
their effectiveness, and Fratzscher et al. (2013) for an empirical comparison of the effects of QE1 and 
QE2. 
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economies, independently of whether QE was implemented by the national central bank 
(Gros, Aldici & De Groen, 2015). 
Our view that the central banks programme – as well as reductions in interest rates – had a 
common underlying source is somehow compatible with implications of the signalling 
channel, if one assumes that QE generated new information about the (future) state of the 
(global) economy for market participants. Following this argument, QE was a sign that the 
crisis would be longer and more severe. Market participants reduced their expectation about 
future growth putting downward pressure on interest rates. However, if one follows this 
interpretation the fall in interest rates might have occurred anyway – at the latest when market 
participants would have revised their expectations about the severity of the crisis.7 
Although several empirical studies credit QE with strong falls in US interest rates, rates fell as 
much in the euro area, where QE was not undertaken (until recently). This finding might imply 
that several studies that neglect the global downward trend might give QE too much credit. 
The absence of a clear, distinct impact of QE episodes on interest rates and the exchange rate 
(e.g. the US), where QE was undertaken, should be puzzling. Although some (event) studies 
demonstrate the very strong impact of QE on interest rates in the country where QE was 
implemented, international long-term interest rates continued to be highly correlated. QE 
therefore had little impact on interest rate differentials (USD versus euro). This aspect also 
explains why asset purchases had little impact on exchange rates. If QE had had such a strong 
impact on interest rates, as often asserted (i.e. in the order of 100 basis points according to 
several event studies),8 one would have expected a strong impact on the exchange rate.  
One way to test the hypothesis that large-scale asset purchases had a separate, identifiable 
impact on long-term interest rates (in the currency area where they are undertaken) for which 
the global downward trend in interest rates does not account is to estimate the cointegrated 
relationship between US and euro area interest rates and to test whether one finds a structural 
break in this relationship around the time that QE was undertaken in the US.  
Apart from the hypothesis stated above, one has to note that the overall effects of large asset 
purchase programmes are still not well understood – even based on a domestic perspective. 
In this regard, QE shocks might differ from conventional interest rate shocks in normal times, 
not only with regard to their relative magnitude, but also by changing relationships between 
economic variables.9 It is well-recognised in theoretical and empirical literature that 
extraordinary and sustained macroeconomic policy actions can affect economic relationships 
and cause structural changes. When the federal funds rate reached the zero lower bound and 
the Fed announced QE in November 2008, it effectively changed its monetary policy variable 
from the federal funds rate to its balance sheet size (Belke & Klose, 2013). In contrast to the 
pre-crisis era, it is now no longer possible to measure monetary policy simply by looking at 
one interest rate.10 Motivated by this circumstance, several authors have argued in favour of 
                                                   
7 See Glick & Leduc (2011) for a similar interpretation. 
8 See, for instance, Gagnon et al. (2011). 
9 Analysing the link between the monetary base and the money supply (defined as M1, M2 or M3) from 
a national perspective, it appears that the relationship has been completely broken since 2008 (Gros, 
Alcidi & De Groen (2015). See also McLeay et al. (2014). 
10 See the growing empirical literature, which tries to measure the monetary policy stance by using 
“shadow rates” (e.g. Lombardi & Zhu, 2014). 
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econometric models that incorporate possible structural changes.11 This aspect is further 
pronounced by Chen et al. (2013), who highlight that pre-crisis models could have become 
obsolete, as unconventional monetary policy might be transmitted in different ways compared 
to monetary policy actions in normal times. 12 To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first 
that tries to test empirically whether QE has changed economic relations on international 
financial markets. 
The paper uses a cointegration approach to analyse whether the Fed’s QE1 has caused a 
structural change in the US-European interest rate relationship. As an empirical approach, we 
use the Johansen procedure (CVAR) in order to estimate the long-run relationship between US 
and European interest rates, also taking developments of the nominal exchange rate into 
account. We use monthly data from 2002 to 2014. After estimating the potential long-run 
relationship, we use recursive methods proposed by Johansen & Juselius (2006) in order to 
check for structural changes with respect to parameter constancy. Our focus on QE1 can be 
explained by two main reasons. First, the general impression and empirical evidence on QE in 
the US indicate that QE1 has been the programme with the highest impact on financial 
variables. Therefore, if one set out an independent effect on US interest rates relative to euro 
interest rates, QE1 might appear to be the natural choice. The second reason is related to the 
statistical approach of this paper. As recursive tests lose the power to detect structural breaks 
at the end of the data sample, it would be difficult to reject the assumption of parameter 
constancy / structural constancy for Operation Twist, QE3 and partly QE2, even if a structural 
break were present. 
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 contains a brief summary of the QE programmes of 
the Fed and a descriptive analysis of their effects on domestic and global interest rates, as well 
as on exchange rates. Furthermore, a short review of empirical results of international QE 
transmission is provided. The data used and the estimation approach is described in section 3. 
The estimation process and the results are presented in section 4. Section 5 sums up our results 
and provides an outlook for further research. 
2. Quantitative easing and global financial markets 
2.1 Purchase programmes in the US  
In November 2008, the Federal Reserve announced the first round of QE (QE1). These 
purchases included debt of government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) and agency mortgage-
backed securities (MBS) of up to $600 billion. After announcing the willingness to extend the 
programme in January 2009, the FOMC decided to purchase an additional $750 billion in 
(agency) MBS, $100 billion in agency debt and also started to purchase long-term treasury 
securities worth $300 billion in March 2009. In total, the Fed purchased assets worth $1.75 
trillion between November 2008 and March 2010; an amount twice the magnitude of total 
Federal Reserve assets prior to 2008. 
In October 2010, the FOMC announced the second round of QE (QE2). It contained purchases 
of $600 billion worth of treasuries and was finished in June 2011. A few months later, the 
implementation of a maturity extension programme, the so-called ‘Operation Twist’ (OT), was 
launched. By purchasing $400 billion worth of treasury bonds with maturities of 6 to 30 years 
                                                   
11 See Kapetanios et al. (2012) and Baumeister & Benati (2012). 
12 Gambacorta et al. (2014) argue in a similar fashion. 
DID QUANTITATIVE EASING AFFECT INTEREST RATES OUTSIDE THE US?  5 
 
and selling bonds with maturities of less than 3 years, the FOMC intended to extend the 
average maturity of the Fed’s portfolio. Eventually, the third round of QE (QE3) started in 
September 2012. It targeted a monthly purchase of $85 billion through the purchase of 
mortgage-backed securities ($40 billion) and longer-term Treasury securities ($45 billion). In 
contrast to the other programmes, the continuation of QE3 was tied to the improvement in the 
labour market. Overall, the Fed balance sheet increased by about $3.5 trillion (roughly 20% of 
GDP).  
Figure 1. Federal Reserve Balance Sheet ($ mil.) 
 
Note: Percentage refers to 2014 GDP.  
Source: Federal Reserve. 
As shown in Figure 1, the balance sheet of the Federal Reserve has now reached over $4 trillion, 
or close to 25% of GDP. Two assets clearly dominate on the asset side: treasury securities and 
federal agency securities. The latter are all guaranteed by the Federal government of the 
United States. It is thus formally true that the Federal Reserve has intervened in the market for 
securitised mortgages, but it has bought only securities guaranteed by the government. In 
terms of the evolution of the balance sheet, one can clearly see the impact of QE 1, 2 and 3. 
The Fed’s QE programmes not only differed in terms of their concrete design, but also with 
regard to the underlying economic environment during the time of their implementation. In 
this regard, Figure 2 presents the CBOE Volatility Index (Chicago Board Options Exchange), 
which is one of the most common measurements of sentiment and systemic risk of the US 
stock market. Apparently, the perception of systemic risk differed strongly over time and 
therefore also between the starting points of the QE programmes.  
As expected, the highest amount of market uncertainty arose after the beginning of the 
financial crisis marked by the bankruptcy of Lehman in September 2008. While markets 
stabilised in 2009 and the perception of systematic risk remained at an overall low level in the 
following years, two peaks of uncertainty are observable in May 2010 and August 2011. While 
the increased perception of systematic risk in May 2010 corresponds to the beginning of the 
European debt crisis, the second peak can be linked to Standard & Poor’s downgrade of the 
US credit rating. Comparing levels of uncertainty around the starting points of the QE 
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programmes, one can conclude that QE1 was implemented in a completely different 
environment from QE2 and QE3. While QE1 was implemented during the height of the crisis 
and therefore in an environment of huge uncertainty, QE2 and QE3 were introduced by the 
Fed when financial markets had already stabilised. This aspect should be kept in mind when 
QE programmes are compared and might also relate to the general assessment of several 
empirical papers that QE1 has been the most effective programme of the Fed. 
Figure 2. CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) 
 
Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). 
2.2 Literature review 
While numerous empirical papers focus on the domestic effects of QE, the empirical evidence 
on international effects is still growing. In this section, we provide a survey of the literature 
that has attempted to quantify the effects of the Fed’s QE programmes. As our paper focuses 
on the effects of QE on interest rate relationships, the following literature review primarily 
focuses on the impacts on financial markets – namely interest rates and exchange rates.  
According to current empirical studies, the general impact of large-scale asset purchase 
programmes seems to vary considerably across countries or regions and also depends on the 
time and circumstances of their implementation. For the US, it looks like QE1 was the most 
effective in influencing financial markets, unemployment and inflation, while QE2 was far less 
effective. As of today, the overall effects and the magnitude of such shocks are highly 
uncertain. Two main sources of uncertainty might explain large differences in the results of 
empirical estimations that try to estimate the impact of QE. Implemented as a direct response 
to the financial crisis, it appears to be extremely difficult to distinguish the effects of large-scale 
purchase programmes, financial markets, and macroeconomic conditions. Secondly, the 
majority of estimation methods and models rely on strong assumptions (for instance, about 
the transmission mechanisms of QE). Changing assumptions might strongly influence the 
results. In relation to this point, Rudebusch et al. (2007) show that although there is no 
structural relationship between the term premium and GDP, a reduced-form empirical 
analysis supports the existence of an inverse relationship between the term premium and real 
economic activity. 
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The aspects mentioned appear to be especially relevant for several event studies, which tend 
to find very large effects of QE compared to studies using different empirical frameworks. The 
two main drawbacks of event studies are heavy assumptions about the identification of 
monetary policy shocks and the focus on a very short period of time. In this regard, the 
standard event study methodology does not provide an estimate of the persistence of a 
monetary policy shock (Wright, 2011).13  
Although the aim of QE was to support the economic development and performance of the 
labour market in general, a large number of studies focus on its effect on long-term yields 
(especially Treasury bond yields). Regarding the effects of QE on domestic interest rates, the 
general consensus is that QE (especially QE1) had a reducing effect on US medium and long-
term yields. Gagnon et al. (2011) investigate the effects of QE1 by using event study as well as 
time series methods. They find that the cumulative effect of LSAP (Large-Scale Asset Purchase) 
announcements on yields of US Treasury bonds as well as US agency fell by up to 150 basis 
points. By scaling the Fed purchases to ’10-year equivalents’, the authors measure the duration 
that the Fed removed from the market. Across the three asset classes that were purchased 
during QE1, the purchases account for more than 20% of the total outstanding 10-year 
equivalents. Gagnon et al. (2011) argue that by reducing the net supply of assets with long 
duration, the programme was successful in reducing the term premium by 30 to 100 basis 
points. In accordance with their results, the authors highlight the importance of the portfolio 
balance channel relative to the signalling channel.  
While Christensen & Rudebusch (2012) find similar cumulative reductions using an event 
study, their empirical results stress the importance of the signalling channel, however.14 
Wright (2011) generates interesting insights using a structural VAR with daily data to identify 
monetary policy shocks. While he finds significant effects on long-term yields, these effects fall 
away quite fast, with an estimated half-life of two months. These results might somehow put 
the very large effects of event studies into perspective. 
Apart from event study methodology, further evidence is presented by Hamilton & Wu (2012) 
who use a term-structure model to predict the effect of a change in the central bank’s asset 
structure (short-for-long-term debt swap) and also indirectly the effect of buying $400 billion 
in long-term Treasuries.15 Their results are much lower compared to the event studies 
mentioned, as they find that such a policy would cause a reduction of the 10-year rate of (only) 
13 basis points. Similar results have been obtained by Neely (2014) and Meyer & Bomfim 
(2010).16 
Chung et al. (2011) find effects that are not negligible. Based on counterfactual model 
simulations, they find that the past and projected expansion of the Federal Reserve’s securities 
holdings since late 2008 are roughly equivalent to a 300 basis point reduction in policy interest 
rates (from 2009 until 2012). Model simulations suggest that the additional stimulus provided 
by the purchases has kept the unemployment rate at a lower level (1½ percentage points by 
2012) than what it would have been in the absence of the purchases and also argued that the 
asset purchases have probably prevented the US economy from falling into deflation. 
                                                   
13 See Hamilton (2011) for several critical remarks on measuring the effects of QE by using event studies. 
14 Further studies using event study methodology: Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011), D’Amico 
& King (2013). 
15 The purchase amount roughly corresponds to the amount of Treasury bonds bought during QE1. 
16 For further evidence, see Krishnamurthy & Vissing-Jorgensen (2011). 
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Liu et al. (2014) find smaller effects. By using a change-point VAR model, they estimated that 
the Fed’s asset purchase programme reduced 10-year spreads by an average of 90 basis points 
over the crisis period. Without the asset purchase programme, the unemployment rate was 
estimated to have been 0.7 percentage points higher and inflation, on average, 1 percentage 
point lower in 2010. 
Regarding the effects on international financial markets, most papers find cross-border effects, 
as well as effects on exchange rates. Fratzscher et al. (2013) examine the international effects of 
QE1 and QE2. They find that QE1 was effective in lowering sovereign yields and raising equity 
markets in the US and abroad. According to their results, QE1 might have generated a safe 
haven effect causing a strong global rebalancing of portfolios out of emerging markets and 
into US equity and funds, thereby putting upward pressure on the US dollar (USD). However, 
regarding the effects of QE2, the authors find that this programme has generally been 
ineffective in lowering yields worldwide and has caused sizeable capital outflows, mainly into 
emerging economies, and thereby marked a USD depreciation.  
Neely (2013) puts more weight on the effects of QE on Treasury yields of developed 
countries.17 Using an event study as well as a portfolio-balance model, Neely (2013) finds 
substantial evidence that QE1 announcements have reduced sovereign yields in the US and 
abroad. Furthermore, Neely (2013) finds significant evidence that QE has generated a general 
depreciation of the USD. Bauer & Neely (2015) use dynamic term structure models to uncover 
whether international yields have declined as a result of signalling or portfolio-balance effects. 
They find that the relative importance of the signalling channel increases with an economy’s 
sensitivity to signals from conventional US monetary policy. Consistent with the notion that 
Canada is highly sensitive to US monetary policy, the authors find large signalling effects for 
Canadian Treasury yields. For Australian and German Treasury bonds, the others find 
especially large portfolio balance effects.  
2.3 Effects of the Fed’s QE on interest rates and exchange rates and inflation 
The aim of large-scale asset purchases is to lower long-term interest rates. Given that short-
term rates are already at the zero lower bound, this amounts to a flattening of the yield curve. 
Furthermore, QE might also work by increasing inflation expectations and thereby decreasing 
real interest rates. 
Keeping the aims of QE in mind, this section focuses on the short- and more medium-term 
evolution of interest, exchange and inflation rates around major QE operations. This 
descriptive approach is thus somehow in contrast to the summarised findings of the academic 
literature presented in the previous chapter, which usually adopts a shorter-term view and 
state of the art econometric methods. We take this approach to check whether large-scale asset 
purchases had an observable impact on key variables.  
Figures 3 and 4 show the evolution of the central bank balance sheets and the evolution of the 
nominal effective exchange rate and that of inflation for the US and the euro area.  Shaded 
areas indicate the QE episodes considered here. In addition, two tables show the short-term 
impact of the announcement and the conduct of the quantitative easing programmes on the 
long-term interest rates, as well as the nominal and inflation-adjusted real exchange rates. 
                                                   
17 Neely uses data from the following countries: the US, Australia, Germany, Japan and the UK. 
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Figure 3. US: Central bank balance sheet, exchange rate and inflation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Federal Reserve. 
For the US, it is difficult to detect any observable impact of the QE programmes on either the 
exchange rate or inflation. The two panels of Figure 3 show that both the exchange rate and 
inflation underwent large swings, which are seemingly unrelated to the various rounds of 
asset purchases by the Federal Reserve. The USD had been depreciating sharply before the 
onset of the financial crisis. Starting in April 2008, the USD started to appreciate strongly and 
continued to do so, even after QE1 was implemented in November 2008. The peak was reached 
in March 2009 (after a rough doubling of the monetary base under QE1). A phase of USD 
weakness followed, which only partially coincided with QE2 until 2011. Since then the USD 
has appreciated trend-wise, despite further tremendous increases in the balance sheet of the 
Federal Reserve under QE3. With regard to the relationship between QE and inflation, it is 
difficult to find a clear impact of QE on inflation. Inflation continued to fall for about two years 
after the start of QE1, then reversed in coincidence with QE2, but then again trended 
downwards, despite QE3 being implemented. 
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Figure 4. Euro area: Central bank balance sheet, exchange rate and inflation  
Source: European Central Bank and Eurostat. 
For the euro area, the link between the central bank’s balance sheet and both the exchange rate 
and inflation appears to be stronger and more persistent (see the two panels of Figure 4). This 
is surprising since there has been no QE in the euro area (until now), and the ECB could 
influence the size of its balance sheet only indirectly via its offers of long-term lending to banks 
at favourable rates. 
Next, we focus on the impact of QE on long-term interest rates. We adopt an approach that 
focuses on the overall effects of the QE programmes. Table 1 provides an overview of the 
impact of QE on long-term interest rates. The column entitled ‘change’ shows the difference 
between the long-term interest rate one-quarter before the start of the actual asset purchases 
and the rate one-quarter after the start of the asset purchase. This variable should thus capture 
both the announcement effect and the impact of the initial implementation.18 As three of the 
four entries in this column are negative, one can conclude that overall QE had the intended 
impact of reducing long-term interest rates. QE2 is the only exception as the long-term interest 
rates actually increased. 
Table 1 also provides in the last column tThe evolution of the interest rate differential, i.e. the 
difference between US and core eEuro area interest rates also appears in the last column. This 
column shows entries that are mostly close to zero indicating no change of the interest rate 
differential around the announcement and introduction of QE programmes. 
 
 
 
                                                   
18 We assume that the market had learned enough about the actual impact of the asset purchases after 
one quarter to correctly anticipate the rest. 
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Table 1. Impact of quantitative easing programmes on interest rates 
 Long-term interest rate (%) 
 Before At start After Change Compared to 
euro area (core) 
Euro area      
PSPP (March 2015) 1.6 … … … … 
United States      
QE1 (Nov. 2008) 3.9 3.3 2.7 -1.1 0.1 
QE2 (Nov. 2010) 2.8 2.9 3.5 0.7 0.0 
Twist (Sept. 2011 3.2 2.4 2.0 -1.2 0.0 
QE3 (Sept. 2012) 1.8 1.6 1.7 -0.1 -0.1 
Note: The data before, at the start and after the start of the quantitative easing programmes refer, 
respectively, to the quarterly averages for the quarter before the start of the programmes, the quarter in 
which the programmes started and the quarter after the start of the programmes. Note that long-term 
interest rates refer to average government bonds maturing in about ten years published by the OECD. 
The euro area core is proxied by the long-term interest rates for Germany. 
Source: OECD. 
Table 2 provides similar information on the reaction of the (effective nominal) exchange rate 
around major QE episodes. The column change again shows the (percentage) difference 
between the nominal effective exchange rate one-quarter before and one-quarter after the start 
of the asset purchases to illustrate the combined announcement and implementation effect. As 
a negative sign indicates a depreciation of the exchange rate, QE1 enters with the wrong sign, 
in the sense that the exchange rate appreciated (although one would expect QE to result in a 
depreciation). 
Table 2. Impact of quantitative easing programmes on exchange rates 
 Nominal effective exchange rate (index 2010=100) 
 Before At start After Change 
Euro area     
PSPP (March 2015 100.3 … … … 
United States     
QE1 (Nov. 2008) 95.8 106.0 108.8 13.0 
QE2 (Nov. 2010) 100.7 97.4 96.1 -4.6 
Twist (Sept. 2011 93.6 94.2 97.8 4.3 
QE3 (Sept. 2012) 99.0 98.9 97.5 -1.5 
Note: The data before, at the start and after the start of the quantitative easing programmes refer, 
respectively, to the quarterly averages for the quarter before the start of the programmes, the quarter in 
which the programmes started and the quarter after the start of the programmes. The nominal effective 
exchange rates (NEER) are the three-month averages of the BIS effective exchange rate indices. An 
increase in the NEER means that the currency has appreciated in nominal terms. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on BIS. 
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2.4 Global financial markets and national QE 
So far our analysis has followed the usual approach of looking for a link between asset 
purchases and financial market variables at the national level. In reality, however, financial 
markets in advanced countries are very open and highly integrated. This implies that one 
should not just look at US financial variables when trying to measure the impact of QE. 
However, disentangling the impact of QE in globally integrated financial markets is much 
more difficult, as one needs to adopt a comparative approach. 
Figure 5. Long-term interest rates in major currency areas since 1990 
 
Source: OECD. 
The first key observation is that in reality (long-term) interest rates have followed a common 
long-term trend across major currency areas. Global financial markets are highly integrated 
and (long-term) rates have been highly correlated across advanced economies, not only along 
a downward trend, but also during cyclical ups and downs, as illustrated in Figure 5. The 
correlation is too tight and has lasted too long to be just a coincidence (Gros, Aldici & De 
Groen, 2015). The most obvious interpretation is that there is a global capital market that is 
integrated across currency boundaries. Short-term interest rates are determined by central 
banks directly and can thus deviate strongly whenever the policy stance is different. Since 2009 
short-term interest rates have basically been equal to zero in both the US and the euro area, 
but long-term (here 10-year) rates have fluctuated, albeit around a clear common downward 
trend. 
The effectiveness of large asset purchases by the Federal Reserve should thus not be measured 
simply by the associated fall in US interest rates, but a fall in the interest rate differential between 
the US and the euro area (or other major markets). However, if one uses this metric, one must 
conclude that large asset purchases by the Fed have failed to have a differential impact on the 
US. Table 3 shows that over most QE periods rates have declined as much, and sometimes 
more than they have in areas where QE was not undertaken. The small size of the changes in 
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the interest-rate differentials is striking. For the US, no QE episode is associated with a change 
in the interest rate differential of more than 0.1%. 
 
Table 3. Counterfactual impact of quantitative easing programmes on long-term interest rates 
Long-Term interest rate (%) 
 Change (ܶାଵ௤ − ܶିଵ௤) Compared to euro area (core) 
United States   
QE1 (Nov. 2008) -1.13 0.06 
QE2 (Nov. 2010) 0.67 -0.05 
Twist (Sept. 2011) -1.16 0.00 
QE3 (Sept. 2012) -0.12 -0.07 
Note: The figures represent the decline/increase in the long-term interest rates in the period around the 
start of the quantitative easing programmes. The changes are calibrated deducting the average interest 
rate in the quarter after the start minus the average of the quarter before the start. Long-term interest 
rates refer to average government bonds maturing in about 10 years published by the OECD. The euro 
area core is proxied by the long-term interest rates for Germany. 
Source: Own elaboration based on data from OECD. 
Table 3 shows the movement of the transatlantic interest rate differential just around major 
large-scale asset purchases in the US. Figure 6 shows the evolution of the long-term (10-year) 
interest-rate differential between the US and the euro area (proxied by the main riskless rate, 
i.e. the German rate). Since the ECB only undertook QE at the very end of this period, one 
would expect that the repeated round of large-asset purchases by the Federal Reserve should 
have resulted in a lowering of long-term US rates relative to euro area rates (i.e. the line should 
have gone up). The opposite has been the case, however: US rates increased relative to euro 
area rates if one compares the period just before QE1 (say May 2008) to January 2014 (i.e. long 
before it could be anticipated that the ECB would also eventually engage in large-scale 
purchases of government bonds). Over this period, the Federal Reserve bought bonds worth 
over 20% of US GDP in total, but US interest rates actually increased (slightly) relative to euro 
area rates. 
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Figure 6. Transatlantic long-term interest rate differential from 2007 
 
Note: The difference between the German and US long-term interest rates is calculated by deducting the 
US rate from the German rate. Long-term interest rates refer to the monthly average government bonds 
maturing in about ten years. The vertical lines indicate the announcements by the Fed of the different 
quantitative-easing measures. Source: Own elaboration based on data from OECD. 
This finding has important policy implications. The ECB has been criticised for not having 
undertaken asset purchases earlier, and it was even argued that one reason the absence of a 
common fiscal agent for the euro area is so important is that it has much delayed the decision 
of the ECB to undertake large purchases of public sector bonds. However, there is no 
indication that the fact that the ECB did not undertake bond purchases when they were 
undertaken by the US (and the UK) in any way led to higher interest rates in the euro area. 
The ECB did of course undertake other ‘unconventional’ monetary policy operations, but these 
were confined to providing more liquidity to the banking system, with the longest maturity 
being (until recently) three-year operations. It is thus difficult to explain the co-movement of 
US and euro area rates with similar monetary policy operations.  
As we stated in the introduction, we believe that the severity of the crisis and economic 
recession in developed economies led to (further) reductions in long-term interest rates across 
countries along the downward trend. In this regard, QE has only been a reaction to the crisis, 
but did not in itself reduce interest rates. The small and non-persistent impact of US QE on the 
interest rate differential, as well as the limited impact on exchange rates and inflation, point in 
that direction as well. As we find no independent, separate effect of the US QE on the US 
economy that cannot be related to the global downward trend, the global comparative 
evidence suggests that several studies might overestimate the impact of QE. However, as 
analysis so far has solely focused on descriptive methods, we will analyse the relationship 
between US interest rates, European interest rates and the nominal exchange rate in a more 
sophisticated econometric approach in chapters 3 and 4. 
2.5 Fiscal policy, debt management and the portfolio balance channel 
Before we turn to the main analysis of this paper, we would like to discuss one additional 
aspect that is closely related to the effectiveness of QE: fiscal debt management. Regarding the 
main channel of transmission, several academics and officials have highlighted the importance 
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of the portfolio-balance channel.19 This transmission channel is based on the preferred habitat 
and imperfect asset substitutability theory and predicts that a reduction in the net supply of a 
given asset should in fact reduce its term premia and thereby its yield (D’Amico & King, 2012). 
In this regard, if the central bank buys large amounts of long-term (Treasury) assets, the central 
bank shortens the maturity structure of debt instruments that private investors have to hold, 
changing the relative net supplies and thereby reducing long-term interest rates. Both 
empirical and theoretical papers mainly find evidence that the portfolio balance channel 
works. 
The theoretical approach assumes, however, that the (fiscal) debt management is exogenous 
and that it does not respond to measures taken by the central bank and therefore does not 
change its behaviour. Greenwood et al. (2014) analyse the debt management of the US 
Treasury during the QE rounds and highlights that the fiscal side tended to supply the markets 
with longer maturity than during normal times / before the crisis. Regarding the supply of 
long-term government debt, the authors show that the amount of government debt with a 
maturity over 5 years held by the public (excluding the Fed’s holding) has actually risen from 
8% of GDP in 2007 to 15% in 2014. Focusing on the volume of 10-year duration equivalent 
debt, the stock has actually doubled from 13% of GDP to 26% over the same interval. Despite 
massive asset-purchase programmes by the Fed, the pressure to absorb (long-term) 
government debt has increased rather than decreased since the beginning of the crisis. 
In this regard, the central bank and the fiscal side have been pushing in opposite directions, 
with debt management policies at least partly offsetting the impact of monetary policy. 
Analysing the reasons, Greenwood et al. (2014) find that roughly two-thirds of the increased 
supply of long-term Treasury debt can be related to the tremendous increase in outstanding 
debt due to large deficits in recent years, while the remaining one-third is due to the Treasury’s 
active policy of extending the average maturity of government debt. The net result of these 
two opposing policies has still been a substantial increase in the longer-term securities held 
overall by the public: the fiscal deficits combined with the lengthening of maturity by the debt 
management office have increased the supply (measured in the equivalent of 10-year bonds) 
by close to 30% of GDP. But the various rounds of asset purchases by the Federal Reserve took 
about 15% of GDP from the market. Therefore, about one-half of this increase in longer-dated 
US federal securities has been undone by the various rounds of asset purchases of the Federal 
Reserve. 
Greenwood et al. (2014) also document that the weighted-average duration of federal debt 
securities issued by the Treasury increased from about 4 years in 2008 to 4.6 years in late 2014. 
However, if one aggregates the Treasury and the Federal Reserve, the (weighted-average) 
duration has actually fallen to 2.9 years (Greenwood et al., 2014, p. 11) – a reduction of 1.7 
years. This lower effective average maturity of the US public (federal) debt might now become 
relevant as the Federal Reserve is about to start increasing rates. The increase in rates will lead 
to a higher cost of debt service more quickly than if the duration of the public debt had been 
at the 4.6 years, which has apparently been the target of the Treasury since 2008. 
Greenwood et al. (2014) conclude that the common impression that the Fed asset purchases 
reduce long-term interest rates through the portfolio-balance effect might be wrong, as “the 
totality of policy has increased rather than decreased the quantity of long-term government 
debt held by private investors.” In this regard, it is argued that the fiscal sector’s policy reaction 
                                                   
19 See Yellen (2011) and Bernanke (2012). 
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has crowded out the portfolio-balance effects of QE, which should theoretically have been the 
case. 
We now turn to our econometric tests of QE impact. 
3. Data and empirical approach 
With regard to our research objective, interest rate measures have to be chosen for the US as 
well as for the euro area. The choice for the US is straightforward, as Treasury bond yields to 
be the most common choice. Since interest rates measure for the euro area, German Treasury 
bond yields are used. We argue that German Treasury bonds are considered to be the least 
risky bonds in the euro area. In this regard, we hope to avoid distortions of the cointegration 
relationships that might be generated by rising risk-premia of other sovereign bonds in the 
euro area at the time of the European debt crisis. Furthermore, the use of Treasury bond yields 
is also motivated by the fact that they are often regarded as a benchmark for domestic interest 
rates. As measures of interest rates, we use 10-year Treasury bonds yields. This implies that 
we focus on long-term interest rate measures.20 We further include the nominal exchange rate 
(USD/euro) in our estimations. We employ monthly end-of-period data between 2002:01 and 
2014:12. For estimation purposes, we use the logarithm of the exchange rate variable. 
Figure 7. Nominal exchange rate ($/€) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The time series are presented in Figures 7 and 8. Regarding the nominal exchange rate, it is 
once again difficult to observe a clear impact of the Fed’s QE rounds. After November 2008, 
the exchange rates show a certain amount of volatility, but appear to fluctuate around a 
constant level. The Treasury bonds yields presented in Figure 8 once again show a downward 
trend in interest rates as well as a strong correlation between both interest rates. Once again, 
no clear impact of QE is visible. 
                                                   
20 We performed similar estimations using 5-year and 7-year yields. Overall, we obtained almost 
identical results. 
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Figure 8. Treasury bond yields – US and Germany 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
The econometric framework applied is a cointegrated vector autoregressive (CVAR) model, 
which allows us to model the impact of domestic interest rate shocks on foreign interest rates 
and the exchange rate while taking care of the feedback between the variables. Our choice is 
also based on the CVAR’s feature to avoid an a priori division of variables into exogenous and 
endogenous. As we include interest rate measures for the US and the euro area, as well as the 
nominal exchange rate, any ex ante causality classification would be arbitrary. The basic 
representation is the p-dimensional vector autoregressive model with Gaussian errors 
(ߝ௧~݅݅݀	ܰ(0,ߗ)): 
ܺ௧ = ܣଵܺ௧ିଵ + ⋯+ ܣ௞ܺ௧ି௞ + ߮ܦ௧ + ߝ௧,			ݐ = 1, … ,ܶ																																 (1) 
where ܺ ௧  is a vector containing the variables of interest; ܦ௧ is a vector of deterministic variables 
containing constants, linear trends and dummy variables. Reformulating the model in an 
error-correction form allows us to distinguish between stationarity that is created by linear 
combinations of the variables and stationarity created by first differencing: 
߂ܺ௧ = Пܺ௧ିଵ + Гଵ߂ܺ௧ିଵ + ⋯ + Г௞ିଵ߂ ௧ܺି௞ିଵ + ߮ܦ௧ + ߝ௧,			ݐ = 1, … ,ܶ    .           (2) 
Equation (2) presents the ECM representation of the VAR model. The VECM form of the model 
gives an intuitive explanation of the data, separating long and short-run effects. While Г௜ 
contains the short-run information, П contains the long-run relationships. Based on the 
insights of Stock & Watson (1988) that a cointegrating relationship represents that two or more 
time series share a common stochastic trend and assuming that our variables are ܫ(1), the rank 
(ݎ) of matrix П has to be reduced (ݎ	 < 	݌). The reduced rank matrix can be factorised into two 
ݎ	ݔ	݌ matrices ߙ and ߚ  (П = ߙߚ′). The factorisation provides ݎ stationary linear combinations 
of the variables (cointegrating vectors) and ݌ − ݎ common stochastic trends of the system. 
As mentioned in section 2, there is a certain probability that the Fed’s introduction of 
quantitative easing might have altered the potential long-run relationship between US and 
euro area interest rates. In accordance with our theoretical approach, if QE was effective in 
reducing long-term interest rates, it should have an effect on US interest rates for which the 
global downward trend in interest rates does not account. Therefore, QE might have had a 
separate, identifiable impact on long-term interest rates in the US, which should show up as a 
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break in the long-run relationship. We thus check for a potential structural break around the 
time of the Fed’s announcements of QE1.  
As our empirical approach is based on the Johansen procedure (CVAR), we use a large set of 
recursive techniques as proposed by Johansen & Juselius (2006) to check for structural changes 
in the relationship. The fundamental idea of recursive testing is to start with a baseline model 
estimated for a subsample and to gradually extend the end point of the sample until the full 
sample is covered. After every extension of the sample, the test statistics are re-estimated. The 
recursive methods used are: 
1) The log likelihood test as a broad test gives us hints as to the general appropriateness of 
the model. In this regard, the test is quite similar to the recursive Chow tests used in single 
equation models. 
2) Recursive tests based on the eigenvalues allow us to obtain detailed information about the 
constancy of the individual cointegration relations. 
3) Recursive tests of the cointegration space. Because the eigenvalues are a quadratic function 
of α and β, the previous group of test is not able to differentiate between non-constancy 
related to α or β. The “max test of a constant β” and the test of “β௜equal to a known β” focus 
on spotting non-constancy in the β structure. 
4) Recursively calculated prediction tests are used to check for systematic predictive failure 
of the model over a specific period of time. 
Additionally, backward recursive estimation techniques are used. As there were several 
rounds of QE in the US between the end of 2008 and 2014, as well as changes in the conduction 
of QE, it is pretty difficult to identify the potential dates of structural breaks ex ante. In this 
regard, recursive tests have the advantage of not requiring the precise date of a potential 
structural break. However, recursive tests lose the ability to discriminate between structural 
stability and non-stability if a potential structural break is near the end of the sample. In this 
regard, it appears to be even more difficult to analyse the relationship for structural breaks 
caused by QE2, Operation Twist and QE3. We therefore focus our analysis on QE1, which was 
announced and started in November 2008 by the Fed, as the announcement and 
implementation of QE1 roughly split our sample in half. Furthermore, our decision to look at 
the impact of QE1 is also motivated by the impression that QE1 is generally considered to be 
more effective compared to its successor programmes.  
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Unit Root Tests 
According to Stock & Watson (1988), a cointegrating relationship can also be regarded as the 
occurrence of common stochastic trends of individual time series. As the first step of our 
analysis, the order of integration of every time series used in our model has to be determined. 
As common in empirical literature, Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) and Phillips Peron (PP) 
tests are used. In order to generate robust results, we perform different specifications 
regarding deterministic components, as the integration order is of essential importance to the 
subsequent cointegration analysis. The entire data sample is used, the maximal number of lags 
is 12 and the Bayesian information criterion is utilised to determine the appropriate number 
of lags included in the ADF test equations. 
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Table 4. Unit root tests  
 Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Phillips Perron Test 
Levels Intercept Intercept & Trend Intercept Intercept & Trend 
US10Y 0.6262 0.6409 0.1579 0.5068 
Ger10Y 0.6262 0.6490 0.6511 0.5750 
EXR 0.9183 0.1843 0.9171 0.4475 
1. Differences     
US10Y 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
Ger10Y 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
EXR 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.002*** 
Note: Asterisks refer to level of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the levels are at least integrated of order one as 
the time series possess at least one stochastic trend. With regard to the results of the first 
differences, the tests propose that they are (trend-) stationary. Therefore, we conclude that the 
time series in levels are integrated of order one (ܫ(1)).  
As mentioned above, the introduction of QE can be regarded as an unparalleled event in the 
recent history of monetary policy. Therefore, not only relationships between variables might 
have changed, but also the behaviour of the time series themselves. As described by Perron 
(1989), structural breaks might have strong effects on the results of unit root tests, sometimes 
leading to wrong implications generated by tests. In order to strengthen the robustness of our 
unit root tests, Zivot-Andrews tests are used. The Zivot-Andrews tests allow for a single break 
in the intercept, the trend or both (Zivot & Andrews, 1992). 
Table 5. Unit root test allowing for structural breaks - Zivot-Andrews tests 
Levels Break (Intercept) Break (Trend) Break (Intercept + Trend) 
US10Y -3.68381 -3.58673 -4.01533 
Ger10Y -3.96228 -3.25455 -3.93304 
EXR -3.04287 -3.53209 -3.98429 
1. Differences    
US10Y -12.498*** -12.368*** -12.509*** 
Ger10Y -12.369*** -12.171*** -12.353*** 
EXR -12.678*** -12.513*** -12.696*** 
Note: Asterisks refer to level of significance: *10%, **5%, ***1%.  
The Bayesian information criteria are used for the purpose of lag length selection. 
Table 5 contains the results of the Zivot-Andrews tests. The results support the findings of the 
ADF and PP tests. With regard to the levels, the null hypothesis of a unit root cannot be 
rejected, even after we allow for various types of structural breaks. As the tests rejected the 
null hypothesis for the first differences, the variables can be considered to be ܫ(1)	in levels. We 
therefore feel that the use of cointegration approaches is legitimate. 
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4.2 Cointegrated VAR estimations  
4.2.1 Estimation of the long-run relationship 
We focus on the relationship between long-term (ten-year) bond yields and neglect further 
real variables such as real GDP, since we are mainly interested in the impact of QE on financial 
markets. Furthermore, if a cointegrating relationship can be detected using a sub-system, the 
long-run relationship should also be present in a larger model that includes additional 
variables. In this regard, our model ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ contains the following variables: 
ܯ௧
ଵ଴௒ = (ܷܵ10ܻ,ܩ݁ݎ10ܻ, ܮܧܺ)௧ᇱ  
Regarding the model, we have to choose a specification regarding the lag length. Furthermore, 
we have to decide which deterministic components are to be included in the VAR, as well as 
in the cointegrating space. Regarding the deterministic components, an intercept into the 
unrestricted VAR and the cointegrating space is included. Because the model resembles the 
Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP), there appears to be no theoretical reason for a linear trend in 
the cointegrating space.21 With regard to the lag length, we include three lags in the 
unrestricted VAR. Although the information criteria suggest two lags, the results of the 
residual analysis improve considerably if an additional lag is included. As the number of the 
degrees of freedoms is still high, we decide to include three lags. For the following dates, 
dummy variables are included into the VAR-equations: 2004:04, 2008:10 and 2008:12. 
However, no dummy variable enters the cointegrating vector(s). 
Table 6. Residual analysis – diagnostic testing on the unrestricted VAR (3)-Model; ܯ௧ଵ଴௒  
Multivariate Test 
Residual autocorrelation: 
LM(1):                 
LM(2):                 
LM(3):                 
LM(4):                 
ChiSqr(9)   =  17.274 [0.045] 
ChiSqr(9)   =  12.794 [0.172] 
ChiSqr(9)   =  9.984 [0.352] 
ChiSqr(9)   =   8.641 [0.471] 
Test for ARCH: 
LM(1):  
LM(2): 
ChiSqr(36)  =  39.863 [0.302] 
ChiSqr(72)  =  72.418 [0.464] 
Univariate Tests 
 ARCH(3) Normality Skewness Kurtosis 
߂Ger10Y 1.322 [0.724] 0.769  [0.681]    -0.145   2.750     
߂US10Y 3.299 [0.348]     3.069  [0.216] -0.022    3.508     
߂LEX 4.914 [0.178]     0.422  [0.810]    -0.028    3.070     
                                                   
21 While the results of the LR-Test of Exclusion do not recommend excluding a deterministic trend from 
the cointegrating space. However, its inclusion does not fundamentally change the results of our 
analysis. After imposing over-identifying restrictions, the deterministic trend also becomes 
insignificant. 
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Note: p-values in brackets. 
Diagnostic tests of the VAR model are presented in Table 6. In order to avoid bias of the trace 
test, the model has to be well specified, especially regarding residual autocorrelation and the 
normality of the residuals. Overall, the assumptions of the CVAR appear to be satisfied. The 
tests do not indicate any issues regarding the assumption of normality. Furthermore, there is 
only small evidence that autocorrelation and ARCH-effects are present. Therefore, we 
conclude that the model is well-specified. 
Table 7. LR Trace Test for the unrestricted VAR (3)-model, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
ݎ ݌ − ݎ Eigenvalue Trace 95% crit. Value ݌-value 
3 0 0.148 40.359 34.565 0.011 
2 1 0.084 15.773 19.932 0.177 
1 2 0.016   2.455 9.219 0.682 
Note: ݌-values for testing the null hypotheses of ܪ଴:ݎ = 0 and	ܪ଴:ݎ ≤ ݅ + 1, 
݅ = 0, 1, 2, respectively, for different ranks r. 
The results of the trace tests are presented in Table 7.22 The results clearly indicate the presence 
of a single cointegrating relationship. Therefore, the rank of the П-matrix is restricted to one. 
Table 8. The just-identified long-run cointegration relations for	ݎ = 1, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
 US10Y Ger10Y EXR Constant 
ߚመଵ 0.116 
[1.755] 
-0.129  
[-2.011] 
1 
[NA] 
-0.353 
[-2.900] 
 ߂US10Y ߂Ger10Y ߂EXR  
ߙොଵ 0.163 
[1.424] 
0.189 
[2.000] 
-0.051 
[-4.114] 
 
Note: The first column reports long-run coefficients	ߚ. The second 
column shows the adjustment coefficients α. t-values in brackets. 
The line above provides the test statistic for over-identifying 
restrictions, which is an LR-test [p-value].  
As the rank of П is chosen to be one, normalising on one of the variables is sufficient in order 
to generate the just-identified long-run relation. The results are presented in Table 8. The long-
run relationship is in line with theoretical expectations. An interest rate increase in one country 
leads to an appreciation in own currency. Regarding the adjustment process, we see the 
expected reaction of the exchange rate as it contributes to reduce deviations from the estimated 
steady state relationship. While the adjustment of the German yield also contributes to 
reducing equilibrium errors, the US yield shows no (significant) sign of adjustment. All 
estimated ߚ-coefficients are significant, at least at the 10% level. 
After estimating the just-identified long-run cointegration relations, placing restrictions on the 
β-vector can be used to test for specific relationships suggested by economic theory. Firstly, 
we test for proportionality between the interest rate measures by restricting the coefficient of 
                                                   
22 We simulate the asymptotic distribution of the trace test. The following settings are used:  
length of random walk: 400, number of replications: 2500. 
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the exchange rate variable to zero. However, the test of restricted model clearly rejects the 
imposed restriction (݌-value = 0.002). Therefore, the exchange rate appears to be an important 
component of the estimated long-run relationship. 
Secondly, we restrict the interest rates to have the same magnitude, but different signs. 
Therefore, we check for a relationship among the interest rate differential between German 
and US yields and the exchange rate that is one common assumption of the UIP. The model is 
accepted (݌-value	= 0.785) at the 10% significance level. The results are presented in Table 9. 
Table 9. The over-identified long-run cointegration relations for ݎ = 1, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒  
 US10Y Ger10Y EXR Constant 
ߚመଵ 0.128 
[2.041] 
-0.128 
[-2.041] 
1 
[NA] 
-0.400 
[-9.691] 
 ߂US10Y ߂Ger10Y ߂EXR  
ߙොଵ 0.145 
[1.238] 
0.193 [2.002] -0.052 
 [-4.021] 
 
Test of restricted model: CHISQR(1) = 0.074 [0.785] 
Note: The first column reports long-run coefficients	ߚ. The second 
column shows the adjustment coefficients α. t-values in brackets. The 
line above provides the test statistic for over-identifying restrictions, 
which is an LR-test [p-value].  
According to our estimations, we obtain the following long-run relationship: 0.400 + 0.128 ∗ (ܩ݁ݎ10ܻ− ܷܵ10ܻ) = ܧܴܺ 
The estimated relationship indicates that a reduction of the US (German) yield should lead to 
a depreciation (appreciation) of the US dollar vis-à-vis the euro, which is in line with economic 
theory. Movements of the exchange rate and the German yields thus reduce deviations from 
the long-run relationships.  
4.2.2 Did QE1 cause a structural break? 
Even though the trace tests strongly recommend one cointegrating relationship, and we have 
found a significant and theoretically correct cointegration relationship, this does not exclude 
the possibility that the model suffers from parameter non-constancy. The purpose of recursive 
tests is to identify whether we have a constant parameter regime and, if this is not the case, to 
identify where in the sample period the data strongly suggest a change in the structure 
(Johansen & Juselius, 2006). Regarding the research question of the paper, the time period 
between 2008:11 and 2010:03 is of importance. In particular, two time dates might be of 
particular interest regarding the possibility of a structural break caused by QE1: firstly, the 
announcement of QE1 in 2008:11 and secondly, the FOMC’s decision to buy Treasury bonds 
as well as an quantitative expansion of the QE programme in 2009:03. 
With regard to our recursive tests, the baseline sample contains data from 2002:04 to 2005:12.23 
Besides the use of forward recursive test, we are also making use of backward recursive tests. 
                                                   
23 In order to check for robustness, we also used the following baseline samples: 2002:04 to 2004:12 and 
200:04 to 2006:12. We obtained similar results, which are available on request. 
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In order to keep the amount of figures manageable, we only include the backward recursive 
estimation if we find contradicting evidence compared to the forward procedure. Regarding 
the backward recursive estimations, the base sample contains data from 2011:12 to 2014:12. 
Because the log-likelihood test is similar to the Chow test used in single equation estimations, 
the test is quite useful in identifying the timing of a structural break. With regard to the results 
presented in Figure 9(a), the test indicates some instability starting around the beginning of 
the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007. However, the evidence is limited. The test statistic 
slightly exceeds the black line which represents the critical value at the 5% significance level, 
and only for a brief period of time. After mid-2008, the test statistic stays below the critical 
value. Surprisingly, we find no evidence of a structural break around the breakdown of 
Lehman-Brothers and the subsequent beginning of the global financial crisis. In this regard, 
we find no clear impact of QE on the test statistics and therefore no evidence of significant 
parameter non-constancy around the introduction of QE1 in 2008:11. Further evidence of a 
structural break starts to appear in the middle of 2010 – at the beginning of the European debt 
crisis. The empirical realisation of the test statistic quickly increases, but fails to reject the null 
hypothesis of parameter constancy. Checking the robustness of these results by using 
backward recursive testing, we once again find no effect of QE on the structure of the 
relationship. 
 
Figure 9. Test for constancy of the log-likelihood, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
(a) Forward recursive estimation 
 
(b) Backward recursive estimation 
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Next, we focus on the stability of the cointegrating relationship by checking the constancy of 
the eigenvalues. Figure 10 depicts the recursively estimated trace test statistics. Both models – 
ܺ(ݐ) and ܴ1(ݐ) – show some signs of instability in the estimated cointegration relation (blue 
graph).24 A first sign of instability appears in mid-2008, as the blue graph decreases strongly. 
Afterwards, the relationship stabilises as the blue graph increases and remains significant at 
the 5% significance level. Around the announcement and implementation of QE1, the 
cointegration relationship shows an almost linear development, indicating no signs of 
structural changes caused by QE1. The largest amount of instability is found around mid-2010 
which corresponds to the beginning of the European Debt Crisis, as the cointegration 
relationship gradually declines and even becomes insignificant at the 5% level. Eventually, in 
mid-2011 the relationship once again starts to increase until the end of the sample. Additional 
evidence is generated in Figure 11, which illustrates the fluctuations of the eigenvalues. The 
graph stays below one, indicating no sign of instabilities. 
Figure 10. Recursively estimated Trace Test statistics, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
 
 
                                                   
24 While the ܺ (ݐ) model contains short-run and long-run information of the data, the ܴ ଵ(ݐ) only contains 
long-run information. 
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Figure 11. Fluctuations of the Eigenvalue, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
  
 
Because the eigenvalue can be expressed as a quadratic term of α and β, those tests do not 
differentiate between instability caused by α and β. As a next step, we focus on the components 
of our long-run relationship, β. We start by presenting the results of the ‘max test of constant 
beta’ test which can be considered as a rather conservative test. In this regard, rejection of the 
null hypothesis would indicate strong evidence of non-constancy in the long-run relationship. 
The results are presented in Figure 12 and show no significant evidence of a possible structural 
break in the long-run relationship. 
Next, the test of ‘ߚ௧ equals a known β’ is used to check for the constancy of β. The main idea of 
the test is to obtain an estimate ߚ෨ based on a chosen reference period. The recursive testing 
will then extend the sample beyond the reference sample checking whether the parameters 
remain constant over time. In this regard, the results can be sensitive to the chosen reference 
sample.25 We chose the reference sample as 2002:04 to 2006:12. Different reference samples 
were employed, but the selection of the reference sample did not change the results 
fundamentally. The results are presented in Figure 13. A first period of instability can be 
established around the beginning of 2008 and therefore around the meltdown of Bear Stearns. 
However, stability is not rejected. Surprisingly, we once again find no evidence of a structural 
meltdown around the peak of the financial crisis in late 2008. Correspondingly, we also find 
no evidence of QE1 impact. The most striking result is the large amount of instability that 
begins to develop around the beginning of the European debt crisis in mid-2010. From this 
data point onwards, the test results indicate that the long-run relationship has changed in 
comparison to the pre-crisis era, as indicated by the rejection of the null hypothesis.  
                                                   
25 In order to obtain robust results, we performed several tests using the following reference sample 
periods: 2002:04 to 2004:12, 2002:04 to 2005:12, 2002:04 to 2007:06 and 2002:04 to 2007:12. However, the 
test does not appear to be sensitive to the reference sample. 
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Figure 12. Test of Beta Constancy, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
 
 
Figure 13. Test of known beta, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
 
 
As a final check, we look at the one step-ahead predictions of the system. The results depicted 
in Figure 14 generate further empirical evidence that there is a certain amount of instability 
between mid-2007 to mid-2008. With regard to the introduction of QE1, the evidence of a break 
is rather limited. However, we find prediction errors in 2009:03 and 2009:04 that might 
correspond to the announcement of the FOMC to start buying US Treasury bonds. The second 
bulk of prediction errors occurs during the onset of the European debt crisis in mid-2010. 
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Figure 14. One step-ahead predictions of the full system, ܯ௧ଵ଴௒ 
 
 
To sum up our results, we detect some empirical evidence of structural changes in the model. 
First of all, we come up with limited evidence that there is some degree of instability prior to 
the outbreak of the global financial crisis (between mid-2007 to mid-2008). Most importantly 
with regard to our research question, we do not find evidence that the announcement and 
conduct of QE1 generated a change in the relationship of ‘risk-free’ bonds of the US and 
Europe. With regard to our results, the highest amount of instability can be found in mid to 
late 2010. Based on the timing, we believe that the beginning of the European debt crisis might 
explain this pattern. In this regard, uncertainty about the future of the euro and the probability 
of a breakup of the euro area might have destabilised the relationship between the nominal 
exchange rate and the interest rate differential. The crisis also resulted in large capital flows 
into Germany – especially from the periphery states of the euro area – driving down German 
Treasury yields. This aspect can be characterised as a ‘safe haven effect’ and might have further 
destabilised the relationship between German and US yields. 
In order to verify the robustness of results presented, additional estimations were conducted 
using five and seven-year yields. The estimations generated almost identical results. 
Therefore, our results do not appear to be sensitive regarding the choice of yields. 
Furthermore, we checked the robustness by including the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) as an 
exogenous variable in order to correct for the systematic risk perception of US financial 
markets. Again, the trace test recommends the presence of one cointegrating relationship (ݎ =1). While the VIX significantly enters the short-term dynamics of the model, the variable is not 
significant in the long-run relationship. Once again, we find no evidence that QE generated a 
structural change in the transatlantic interest-rate relationship.26 
5. Conclusions 
Did quantitative easing generate a structural break in the relationship between European and 
US long-term interest rates which, in turn, may be considered as an individual effect of QE on 
US interest rates and financial markets? The estimation results of our CVAR analysis generated 
theoretically expected relationships between US and European yields, as well as the nominal 
                                                   
26 Results of the robustness checks are available on request. 
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exchange rate. By using recursive estimation methods, we did not find significant evidence of 
a structural break in the interest rate relationship caused by QE1. 
Following our hypothesis, we therefore conclude that there is no evidence that QE had an 
effect on US interest rates that cannot also be explained by the global downward trend in (long-
term) interest rates. While we cannot reject QE1 having no impact on the transatlantic interest 
rate relationship, we find evidence that the beginning of the European debt crisis had a more 
destabilising impact on the relationship. 
As our analysis focused on the effects of QE1, it is possible that QE2 or QE3 had different 
effects on the interest rate relationship. As the asset purchases during QE2 consisted solely of 
US Treasury bonds, there may have been a strong(er) effect on the transatlantic relationship of 
‘risk-free’ bonds. On the other hand, the effects of QE2 and also QE3 are generally considered 
to be even smaller compared to QE1. In this regard, we do not believe that QE2 and QE3 had 
a more pronounced effect on the interest rate relationship than QE1. 
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